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SANGUINETTI v.MooaE DltYDOOX 00. 657 
36 OaL2d 812 Cite as 22S P.2d MT 
, 'SANGUINETTI Y. MOORE DRY. plaint to be amended I>y··:increasing 
DOCK CO.' prayer for damages, is improper. 
the 
,\. S. F. 18232. 
Supreme Court of CalifornIa, In Bank. 
Marob 13, 1951. 
Rebearlng Denied Aprllt2, t95L 
Aotlon nnder the Jones Aet by LouIs L. 
Sanguinetti against Moore.,Dry Dook Com-
P&D1, also known as MooreDrydoek Com-
pany. a rorpor"tlon, for "injuries .sustained by 
PJaintirr ·wbll. In the employ Or defendant. 
The Superior Court In and for the City and 
County of San FrancIs"", LU. T. Jacks, J., 
entered judgment for plaintiff' and the de-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Scbauer, J., ~eld that the operator in charge 
ot ,a tug was a master entitled to sue under 
the JoneS' Act and that moving to increase In 
the presence ot the jury at the conclusion of 
plftlntltf's ease In cbief for leave to amend 
cOmplaint' 80 as to increase the amount 
sued tor was prejudicial error. 
Judgment reversed and caused remanded 
tor a new trial. 
Gibson, O. J., Traynor and Carter, JJ., dis-
sented. 
For prior opinion see 220 P.2d 398. 
I .. Workman', compensation ¢:::::>262, 2089 
Operator in charge of a tug who at 
the time .he was injured was actively en~ 
gaged as master in navigating the tug and 
was primarily on board to aid in navigation 
'was a "master" excluded from the -coverage 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act and 
was entitled to mainta'in an action under the 
JOt)es Act for injuries. Jones Act, 46 U.S. 
c.A .. § 688; Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, 
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901, 902, 903, 905. . 
See publication Words aod PhrasC8, 
,tor other ju~icial constructions aDd defi~ 
nitiOJ1:8 of UMllster~·. 
2. 'Damages' *'>210(2) 
Jury may be instructed as to the maxi-
inum.verdict which may be returned. 
3. Trial .*'>106 
The making of a motion in the pres-
ence of the jury after production of ev1 6 
dence; to increase the amount of- damages 
asked, and to bring to the knowledge of 
the jury, the fact that the court after hear-
ing plaintiff's evidence permitted the com-
4. Damages *'>208(1) 
The amount of damages is ordinarily 
a question of fact for the jury. 
5. Seamen *'>29(4) 
In action under the Jones Act, if 
plaintiff had shown injuries for which 
amount claimed in complaint would con~ 
stitute clear compensation, ht; would _ not 
necessarily be entitled to recover such 
amount, if his own negligence contributed 
proximately and in any substantial degree 
to such injuries, and it. would be the duty 
of the jury, to compare the negligence of 
the parties, and award plaintiff only that 
proportion of the 'amount claimed which 
defendant's negligence bears to the entire 
negligence attributable to both parties. 
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688. 
6. Negligence *,>136(14, 25) 
The issues of negligence and proxi~ 
mate cause are ,es~entially questions of fact. 
7. Negllgen.o *'>136(31) 
Question of comparative negligence is 
essentially one of fact. 
6. Appeal and orror *'>1041(2) 
In action under -the Jones Act, act 01 
counsel for plaintiff in moving in presence 
of Jury at conclusion' of plaintiff's 'case in 
chief for leave to amend the complaint so 
as to increase the amount sued for was 
prejudicial error, where jury returned 
the full amount demanded, substantial evi-
dence supported position "fdefendant that 
plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused 
by his own negligertc'e, and that if the negli-
gence of defendant proximately contributed 
to the injuries the damages as'sessed should 
be reduced by the jury under the compata-
tive negligence doctrine. Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C.A.§ 688. 
9. Appeal and error *'>978(2) 
While conclusion of trial court on a 
motion for new trial with respect to con~ 
duct of ""ullsel of plaintiff in moving to 
amend complaint in presence of jury is 
entitled to much consideration, its deci-
sion thereon' is not conclusive on appeal. 
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Williamson & Wallace, BrCfbeck, Phle-
ger & Harrison, Wallace, Garrison, Norton 
& Ray and Moses LaskY, al1 of San Fran-
cisco, for appellant. 
Dion R Holm, City Atty., Edmond P. 
. Bergerot and George E. Baglin, Deputy 
City Attys., all of San Francisco, Jennings 
& Belcher, Betts, Ely & Loomis, a1l of Los 
Angeles, as amicus curiz on behalf of ap-
pe1lant. 
Hoberg & Finger, Henry G. Sanford 
and John H. Finger, all of San Francisco, 
for respondent. 
SCHAUER, Justice. 
Defendant appeals from a judgment ren-
dered against it in plaintiff's action, 
brought under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C.A. 
§ 688)1, to recover for injuries suffered by 
him while employed as the operator of 
defendant's tugboat, the uMoore No.2." 
We conclude tohat by reason of the miscon-
duct of counsel in moving in the presence 
of the jury, at the close of plaintiff's evi-
dence, to amend the complaint 'by increas-
ing the amount prayed for as damages, 
which motion was subsequently granted by 
the trial court, and the fact thereof brought 
to the attention of the jury, the judgment 
must be reversed. 
The tugboat, 45' 10" in length and 12' 9" 
wide, was used to tow other craft, to place 
barges alongside hulls under repair at de-
fendant's shipyards in the Oakland Estuary, 
and to go where needed around San Fran-
cisco Bay. When the tug was not in use, 
plaintiff did rigging work in the yard. He 
testified that his 4O-hour work week was 
divided into approximately 24 hours as 
master of the tugboat and 16 hours as rig-
ger; his hourly rate of pay was greater 
as tugboat operator than as rigger. His 
orders came from the rigging department. 
Plaintiff sometimes handled the tug alone 
and at other times was assisted by a deck-
hand. 
On May 2, 1947, plaintiff, pursuant to 
orders, took the tugboat from defendant's 
I. "Any seaman· who shall suffer personal 
injury in the course of his employment 
may, at his election, maintain an action 
for damages at law, with the right of 
iIoial by jury, and in such action all 
Oakland yard to Pier 18 in San Francisco, 
picked up a 66' derrick, barge loaded with 
scrap steel, and towed the barge back to 
the Oakland yard where the steel was un-
loaded. The barge was then to be docked 
at a pier a short distance away. Plaintiff 
testified that while the tug was in motion 
during the docking operations, it became 
necessary, because of a faulty clutch on 
the tug, for him to jump back and forth 
from the tug to the barge. In so doing ile 
lost his balance and his left leg was pinned 
between the tug and the barge as they 
swung together, and was badly ~ru.hed. 
Defendant's first contention on appeal is 
that plaintiff was not a seaman entitled to 
sue under the Jones Act, but was rather a 
harbor worker whose exclusive remedy is 
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act (44 Stat. 1424, 
ch. 509, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901, 905). That 
Act provides in section 902, however, that 
"(3) The term 'employee' does not include 
a master or member of a crew of any ves-
sel * * * ," and in section 903 that 
"* • * No compensation shall be pay-
able in respect of the disability or deathl 
01-(1) A master or member 01 a crew of 
any vessel * • *." 
[1] Defendant's eounsel in his opening 
statement declared that plaintiff Cfwas the 
operator in charge of the tug, and he was 
in law what would be called a 'master', al-
though in connection with tugs, it is nor-
htally called an operator * * *." At 
the time plaintiff. was injured he was ac-
tively engaged as master in navigating the 
tug and was "naturally and primarily on 
board to aid in her navigation" (South 
Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett 
(1939), 309 U.S. 251, 260, 60 S.Ct 544, 84 
L.Ed. 732). It thus appears that, as plain-
tiff asserts, under the holding of the case 
just cited and of Warner v. Gohra (1934), 
293 U.S. ISS, 159, 55 S.Ct. 46, 79 L.Ed. 254, 
and Norton v. Warner Co. (1944),321 U.S. 
565, 571-572, 64 S.Ct. 747, 88 L.Ed. 931, he 
is as master excluded from the coverage 
statutes of the United Statea modifying 
or extending the common·law right of 
remedy in cases of personal injury to 
rlll1way employees shall apply * • • I, 
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of the Workers' Compensation Act, and is his motion for a mistrial on the ground of 
entitled to maintain. this action. Moore misconduct of plaintiffs counsel in pre-
Dry Dock Co, v. Pillsbury (1938), 9 Cir., senting the motion in the jury's presence, 
100 F.2d 245, relied upon by defendant, and the court denied defendant's motion. 
concerned a deckhand who was droWned Defendant then presented its evidence, and 
while engaged in repairing a tugbOat while the caSe went to the jury with an instruc-
she was tied up at the dock, and is not tion, among others, that (tThe damages 
decisive here. must be reasonable and cannot be in ex-
Defendant next contends that plaintiff's 
counsel committed misconduct in moving, 
in the presence of the jury, to amend the 
prayer of the complaint to ask $75,000 in-
stead of $50,000 in damages, and thit such 
misconduct when followed by the action 
of the court, after argument without the 
jury's presence, in granting the motion, re-
sulted in such prejudice to defendant as to 
require reversal of the judgment .. 
The record discloses the .following pro-
ceedings in the jury's presence at the close 
of plaintiff's case: 
""Mr. Hoberg [Counsel for Plaintiff]: 
• • • Plaintiff will rest but asks leave 
to amend the complaint to increase the 
amount in the prayer .. from $50,000 to '$75,-
000 incurred and to be incurred on the evi-
dence that has been submitted here 'before 
the Court and jury. 
"Mr. Ray [Counsel for Defendant]: I 
desire to argue that matter in chambers 
and reserve the right at this time to move 
for a mis-trial upon the gr_ounds of plain-
tiff's misconduct in connection with the 
motion. 
"The Court: Well, I will hear- .that mat-
ter out of the presence of the jury." 
The jurors were then dismissed, and the 
following proceedings had: 
--The Court: Now, then, in 'regard to 
this motion ,to amend the complaint, have 
yoit any authority there, or do you want to 
let it go over until tomorrow? 
"Mr. Hoberg: 'Ther~ is no question 
about this, your Honor. I have done it a 
hundred times. 
"The Court: It is done every day ,here, 
but I don't know whether in raising the 
amount-whether that is a matter that 
should have gone in outside of the pres-
-ence ,of the jury." 
After argument the court granted plain-
tiff's motion, defendant thereupon renewed 
228P.2d-13 
cess of the amount alleged in the complaint, 
namely $75,000." The jury retired from 
"the courtroom, and, thirty-five minutes lat-
er returned with a verdict for plaintiff in 
the sum of $75,000. . 
[2] No California decision directly in 
point has been cited or discovered by our 
research. It is, of tourse, the rule in this 
State that the jury may be ·instructed as 
to the maximum verdict which may be re-
turned,as was done here. (Lahti v. Mc-
Menamin (1928), Z04 Cal. 415, 421, 268 P. 
644; see also McNulty v. Southern Pacific 
Co. (1950), 96 Cal.App2d841, 216 P.2d 
534.) In Buswell v. City & County of San 
Francisco (1948), 89 CaI.App.2d 123, 133, 
ZOO P.2d 115, in discussing defendant's 
point that a .permitted amendment to in-
crease the prayer had not been "formally 
made to the complaint," the court mentions 
that "At the end of the trial and in the 
absence of fhe jury, plaintiffs moved to 
amend the complaint; to conform to the 
proof 'by 'increasing the prayer • • * 
Defendant vigorously objected. The court 
granted the motion." (Italics added.) The 
point before us in the- instant case was thus 
not Involved In Buswell. In Duffey v. Gen-
eral Petroleum Corp. (1949),93 CaI.App.2d 
757, 758-759,209 P.2d 986,'t is stated that 
"At the beginning of the trial, on October 
19, 1948, plaintiffs' counsel moved to amend 
the complaint by increasing the amount of 
the alleged damage to $4,000, and the mo-
tion was granted. Defendant interposed 
an objection to the amendment, but did not 
ask for a continuance of the _ trial by rea-
son thereof. The jury returned a verdict 
for $4,000." (Italics added.) No discus-
sion of the point :he:-e at issue appears in 
the opinion. 
In several New York eases the impropri. 
ety of movingr, in the jury's presence, for 
permission to increase the amount sought 
in the prayer of the complaint is discussed 
--------------~,~,-~ ...---------.... ....,-. ..,**~--------------~. 
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and the practice' condemned. Thus, in 
Kenney in South Shore Na lural Gas & Fuel 
Co. (1908); 126 App.Div. 236, 110 N.Y.S. 
503, 504-505; a· personal injury action, 
"After the selection of the jury, and betM" 
any evidence had been taken, plaintiff 
moved to amend her complaint by changing 
the amount asked in her prayer for relief 
from $10,000 to $25,000. Defendant's 
counsel duly objected, and the court re-
served its decision thereon. The evidence 
on both sides had been pradically complet-
ed before the court passed upon the motion, 
and allowed the amendment asked for." 
The verdict was for $20,000. On appeal 
the judgment was reversed, with the follow-
ing observations by the court: uIt seems 
that the court on the trial of an action 
may, in the proper exercise of its discre-
tion, permit plaintiff to amend his corn-
p1aint by increasing the amount of damages 
demarided. CCitations.] • • • [But] we 
do not think such an amendment can prop-
erly be permitted • • • [without] ex-
plaining why application for the privilege 
had not' pr~viously been made * * • 
[and] some reason showing the propriety 
of the amendment" * * *. 
.~, •.• : -,. the record now before us 
* . * .*. discloses no reason for granting 
the motion; unless the action of the Court 
thereon' was influenced by the evidence pro-
dt1Ced on the trial as to the extent and na-
ture of plaintiff's injuries. * • • [nor] 
is there * * * in the statement of the 
court on granting the motion, a suggestion 
of a reason why such an amendment was 
asked for at that time, nor why it was then 
granted * * *. As the motion was 
made in the presence of the jury, and the 
court held its disposition thereof until aft-
er the evidence 'l(.ras concluded, it is at 
least probable that the jury may have been 
to some extent influenced in arriving at 
the unusually large verdict awarded by the, 
perhaps unwarranted, assumption that the 
court, after hearing the evidence, conclud-
ed that plaintiff had shown herself entitled 
to larger damages than she had at first de-
manded in her complaint, and that the 
court's favorable action all the -motion 
was due to that fact." (Italics added.) 
In Sandresky v. Erie R Co. (1915), 91 
Misc. 67, 153 N.Y.S. 612, 613, "At the 
opening of the trial, without an affidavit 
of the plaintiff, the latter was permitted 
to amend his complaint, increasing thc de-
mand for damages * * *" for personal 
injuries. After pointing out that the plain-
tiff had failed to explain why he had de-
layed until trial his motion -to amend, and 
that the rule called for denial of the mo-
tion under such circumstances, the court 
concluded, uWe think the present case is 
within the rule, and that it was error to 
permit the plaintiff to amend the complaint 
in lhe pr.sfflce of lhe jury, and that be-
cause of this error the judgment should be 
reversed, with costs, unless the plaintiff 
is willing to stipulate that the damages 
'&hall be reduced to come within the cause 
of action originally pleaded." (Italics add-
ed.) 
In Walker v. Bradt (1929),225 App.Di\". 
415, 233 N.Y.S. 388, 391, the following ap-
pears: "Appellant's contention that the 
court erred in permitting plaintiff during 
the trial to increase the demand in her 
complaint from $3,000 to $6,000 is without 
merit. We are satisfied .that this was not 
done in Ihe hearing of lhe jury, and the 
amount of the verdict was less than $3,000." 
(Italics added.) 
In Pfeil v. Klein (1936), 247 App.Div. 
510, 286 N.Y.S. 721, 722, a personal injury 
action, the court said: "Plaintiff gave no· 
intimation of any claim of damage, be-
yond $3,000, until the case was fully tried 
and the jury had been charged, and then 
asked to amend the complaint so as to de-
mand $20,000 damage5. This motion was 
denied, and then the court granted a motior. 
to conform the pleadings to the proof. Tht 
verdict. was for $8,000. 
"The effect of the granting of the mo-
tion to conform the pleadings to the proof 
was to conform the pleading to whatever 
verdict the jury might find, and this, oc-
curring, as it did, in the presence of tlu:" 
jUTy~ carried the implication that the court 
thought that the proof warranted a verdict 
larger than $3,000. This caused prejudice 
,to defendants, which requires a reversc.l. 
[Citing the Sandresky and Kenney cases,. 
supra.] 
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, . "lJad tlte ver,dict been $3,000 or less, no 
fu.:nnwould have been done. ,Blackwell 
v. Finlay [1922], 233 ,N.Y. 361,' 364, 135 
N.E.600;' Walker 'v. Bradt [supra] 
** •. " (Italics added.) 
'In Blackwell v. Finlay, cited in P~ei1 v. 
Klein, supra, "Plaintiff,. an !lttomey -•. -, 
brought suit to recover the reasonable value 
of services rendered by him to defendant 
• *,*., The jury found for the plaintiff 
• • . *, and rendered a verdict in his fa .. 
~orfor $10,000 *' * *, which was the 
amount demanded :in .the complaint." In 
affirming the judgment the court comment-
ed (at page 364 of 233 N.Y. at page 601 of 
135 N.E.): "At the close, of the evidence 
.tl)eplaintiff was i'Ormitted to amend his 
complaint by. alleging that the value 01 
his services was $17,000 and demanding 
judgment, for that amount. If the verdict 
had been for more than the amount origi-
nally, demanded, it might have been urged 
that this was an abuse of discretion and 
~hat-the tlial judge ,was without power to 
permit, the amendment. Vole agree, how-
ever, • • .. *. -that defendant was not 
Prejudiced. He ,was not contesting the 
value of th~ _ services as originaJIy alleged 
in ,the· complaint." 
, And' in Sohman v. 'Metropolitan St. Ry. 
Co. (1907), 56 Misc. 342, 106 N.Y.S. 1033, 
in denyihg: de£~dant's motion to set- ~side 
a verdict 'on :-the ground' of ,Surprise. the 
court states, "The amendment of the com-
plaiI)t byinereasing the' amount of dam-
ages claimed' was granted at, the close, of 
the case' after ·all the evidence was before 
the court. The argument ,was made in the 
absence' of the jury, which had left the 
courtrooin by direction bf 'the presiding 
justice, and in accordance with his iristruc~ 
tions' no mention was made of the granting 
of 'such motion by counsel in summing up 
to 'the jury." ' 
It,. the ~is~o~ri case of Prichard v. Du~ 
binsky (1935), 338 Mo. 360, 89 S.W.2d 
2 •. ' Such' instrUctions include the' following: 
·,tyotJ will distinctly understand that in 
this charge th.e Court is in no manner 
'or fOM expressing, or desires' to express, 
'auy' op~ion on the weight of the ~videnee~ 
Or any part thereof; nor does the C~tirt 
express .any opinion as to the. t~tJi QI: 
;~ ," . 
530, 531, in rejectinjt defendant's contention 
that "the court shOllld not have permitted 
piaintiff to amend the petition at the close 
of the evidence, byjincreasing the $10,000 
prayed for as. damages to $2O,OOO/, it ,is. 
pointed out thatl, "11te amendment was not' 
made in the presence of the jury." (See 
also Hinchliffe' v. 'Wenig Teaming Co. 
(1916), 274 111. 417, 113 N.E. 7fJ7, 708.) 
, . ,., . 
[3-4] Regarc!less of the lack of Califor-
nia authority on th(; precise point. at issue, 
we are ·convinced that· any .practice which 
would include.th~_:IP-aking of a·motion, in 
the presence of the jury, after production of 
evidence, to. increase the amount of dam-
ages asked, and which would bring to the 
knowledge of the jury the fact that the 
court after hearing plaintiff's evidence per-
mitted the complaint to be amended by in-
creasing .the 'prayer: ·.for damages, should be 
unhesitatingly .con~emned and stricken 
down. As. commented in Starr v" United 
States (1894), 153 U.S. 614,,626, 14S.Ct. 
919,.38 L.Ed. 841, quoted in Bollenbach v. 
United States (1946), 326 U.S. 607, 612, 
66 S.Ct. 402, 90 ,L.Ed. 350,"lt is obvious 
that under any system of jury trials the, in-
fluence of the trial judge on the jury is 
necessarily and, prqperly of great weight, 
and that his ligh~est, word ,or intimation i~ 
received with deference, and may prove con-
trolling." (See ,also Vaughan v. Magee 
(1914, 3 Cir.); 218 'F. 630, 631.) It is, of 
course, elementaIt 9iat the amount of :dam-
ages is ordinarily a, question of fact to be 
determined by the ,jury. (See 8 CaI.Jur. 
87i,sec. 119, and cases there cited.) 
I 
Plaintiff urges that in any event defend-
ant eould not ha-k ~een prejudiced by what 
occurred, inasmutli as the court, ~s6 in-
structed the jury generally that they were 
the sale judges of :the evidence, they were 
not' to be influenc~d;on factual issues by'any 
action of the court;''that they were the 'sole 
judges of any daln10ges to be awarded, and 
that any· such damages must be. reasonable.! 
: 111 ,1 
falsity of the testimony' of any witness; 
nor does the ,Court in ant manner or 
form express its opinion tbat any al-
leged faet in thill case'is or is Dot proven. 
With qUeStiODS bf fact,' the weight of evi-
dence, the credit that you should give to 
auy witness ,worn in ·th_e easc,· the Court 
-------_._----;&;,."",,,,,'*''''<! 
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Plaintiff also points out that defendant 
makes no contention that the jury's ver~ 
diet is disproportionate to the injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff. But regardless of the 
possible effect (or lack of effect) of this 
fact in· a case based on California law, it 
cannot be decisive here where issue was 
joined not only on the amount of injuries 
sustained but also (under the Jones Act) on 
the proportionate responsibility (compara-
tive negligence) of the parties, and where, 
upon the state of the evidence, a large meas ... 
ure of discretion rests with the jury. 
[5-7] Defendant specifically resisted 
plaintiff's claim of damages, on the ground 
that plairitiff's injuries were proximately 
caused by his own negligence rather than 
that of defendant, and on the further 
ground that if any negligence of defendant 
were found to have proximately contributed 
to such injuries, then the damages to be 
assessed should be reduced by the jury un-
der the comparative negligence doctrine 
which applies under the Jones Act. (See 
The J. H. Hillman, 3 Cir. (1939), 108 F.2d 
231; Stewart v. United States, D.C. (1928), 
25 F.2d 869.) Substantial evidence was in-
troduced by defendant in support of its po-
sition. Assuming that plaintiff had shown 
baa nothing to do. These Bre matters 
entirely within your province, and which 
7011, as jurors, under your oaths, must 
determine for yourselves. III • • 
"It the judge of this Court has at any 
time during this trial used any language, 
or has seemed to you to indicate the 
opinion of the judge as to any question of 
fact, or as to the credibility of any wit~ 
ness, you must not be influenced thereby, 
but must determine yourselves all ques~ 
tionS· of fact without regard to the opin~ 
ion of anyone else. 
"The Court charges you that you are 
Dot to use in the consideration or deter~ 
mination of any facts in the case any 
reference to or comment on the evidence 
which may have been made by the Court 
during the course of the trial, in con~ 
nection with the admission of testimony 
or otherwise. The determination of the 
facts of the case is solely withit. your 
province, and yon are not to be assisted 
or influenced in any way by anything 
which the Court may say or do in that 
behalf. III III III, 
"It is for you alone to judge of the 
credibility of the witnesses, the weight 
injuries for which $75,000 would constitute 
fair compensation he is, nevertheless, not 
entitled to recover $75,000 from defendant 
if plaintiff's own negligence contributed 
proximately and in any substantial degree 
to those injuries. In such event it would be 
the duty of the jury to compare the negli-
gence of plaintiff with that of defendant and, 
to award plaintiff only that proportion of 
$75,000 which defendant's negligence bears 
to ''the entire negligence attributable to both 
the plaintiff and the defendant." (Haskins 
v. Southern Pac. Co. (1934), 3 Ca1.App.2d 
177, 191, 39 P.2d 895.) This is not, there-
fore, a case in which the error can be said 
to be non prejudicial because the issues were 
resolved on undisputed or overwhelming ev. 
idence. (See Blanton v. Curry (1942). 20 
Ca1.2d 793, 813, 129 P.2d 1; Anderson v. 
Hagen (1937), 19 Cal.App.2d 714, 726, 66 
P.2d 168; Wilkerson v. City of EI Monte 
(1936), 17 Cal.App.2d 615, 623, 62 P.2d 790 
(Hrg.Den.).) As often emphasized by this 
court (see e.g., Anthony v. Hobbie (1945), 
25 Cal.Zd 814,817-818, 155 P.2d 826). "The 
issues of negligence and proximate cause 
are essentially questions of fact." Likewise 
is the question of comparative negligence 
essentially one' of fact, and because that 
question is ordinarily resolved by the jury 
to be given the evidence offered, and its 
elfects, and its conclusiveness, to esta}).. 
lish any fact for which it has been of~ 
fered. III III III 
". • III I, of course, do not know 
whether you will need instructions on the 
measure of damages, and the fact that 
they have been given' to you -must not 
be considered 8S intimating any opinion 
of my own on the issue of liability or 
as to which party is entitled to your 
verdict. III • • 
"You are instructed that the law pre~ 
scribes no definite measure of damages, 
but the law leaves such damages to be 
fixed by you as your discretion dictates 
and as, under all the circumstances, may 
be just and proper. It is not necessary, 
therefore, that any witness should have 
expressed an opinion as to the amount 
of such damages, if any, sustained by 
plaintiff, but it is for you, the ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, to make'such es-
timate of the damages, if any, from all 
of the facts and circumstances revealed 
by the evidence. and by considering them 
in connection with your own knowledge 
and experience in the alfairs in life." 
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o"ly by awarding a lump sum to the plain- doubt of the necessi!); of helping the, in-
tiff, which sum must constitute reasonable jured plaIntiff 'to the witness chair, were 
compensation for his injuries less such pro- prejudicial and constil\tted ,reversible error: 
portion of the reasonable compensation as The opinion comments .(203 Cal. .-at pages 
may be attributable to his own fault, the 120-121, 263 P. at pag~s 22i-223), that "It 
likelihood of prejudice from an error such needs no citation to convince any unbiased 
as that which we have here is intensified. observer that a jury has both ears and eyes 
[8] . Under the circumstances we find no 
reasonable basis for holding that defendant 
was not prejudiced by the jury's knowledge 
that the court had permitted plaintiff to ask 
for $75,000, rather than $50,000, "incurred 
and to be incitrr-ed on the evidence that has 
been submitted here before the Court and 
jury," especially when consideration is giv-
en to the further fact that, as defendant 
points out, the "jurors retired, elected a 
foreman, reached a verdict~ fined in the form 
of verdict, haei it signed by the foreman, 
notified the bailiff, the bailiff notified the 
court, the court' notified cotinsel, and the 
jury returned to the courtroom, all in 35 
minutes." 
The situation here, in legal effect, is ba .. 
sically comparable to that i,n Oettinger v. 
Stewart (1944), 24 CaI.2d 133, 140, 148 P. 
2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221, which prompted the 
court to say, "In cases where it clearly ap .. 
pears that the jury did not rely upon the 
erroneous instructions, the j""dgment may be 
affirmed on the ground that the. error is_not 
prejudicial. This, however, is :not such a 
case. Neither the evidence of contributory 
negligence nor of negligence. although suf-
ficient as a matter of law, can be said to be 
convincing, -and we should not speculate 
upon the basis of the verdict." To the same 
effect see also Pipoly v. Benson (1942), 20 
CaI.2d 366, 375, 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 
515; People v. Dail. (1943), 22 Cal2d 642, 
140 P.2d 828; Intagliata v. Shipowners & 
Merchants Towboat Co. (1945), 26 Cal.2d 
365, 382, 159 P 2d 1; Oement v. State Rec-
lamation Board (1950), 35 CaI.2d 628, 
220 P2d 897. We think that the implica-
tions of prejudice are at least as strong in 
a case such as this as in ,any of the cases 
cited. 
In Berguin v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1928), 
203 Cal.· 116, 118--121, 263 P. 220, it was 
held that comments by the trial court in 
the jury's presence which indicated his 
open fot any little wQI-d or act of the trial 
judge from which th~ may gather enough 
to read his mind and g.ct, his opinion of the 
merits of the issues under review. * • • 
The above error must, therefore, be held 
sufficient in and of _itself under the circum-
stances of this case to' 'compel a reversaJ of 
the judgment • • •. " (See also People 
v. Williams (1860), 17 Cal. 142, 147; Peo-
ple v. Mahoney (1927), 201 Cal. 618, 626-
627, 258 P. 607; People v. Frank (1925), 
71 CaI.App. 575, 581-582, 236P. 189; Peo-
ple v. Robinson (1946),73 CaI.App.2d 233, 
237, 166 P.2d 17 ;Citti v. Bava (1928), 204 
Cal. 136, 138--139, 266 P. 954; Steele v. 
Wardwell (1943), 57 CaI.App.2d 642, ,648-
652, 135 P.2d 628, in' which the appellate 
court commented "This was a close case and 
the statements made by the court may well 
have been the determining factor. In our 
opinion, the entire cas. 'should be reversed. 
• • ."; Anderson v; Hagen'(1937),19 
Cal.App.2d 714, 726, 66 P.2d 168, in which 
the court reversed. saying, "BeCause the 
evidence on this vitali point _ was in direct 
conflict, ,the error of .admitting this [hear-
say] testimony cannol be· said tob. with-
out prejudice",; Curti$hr. McAuliffe (1930), 
106 Cal.App. 1, 8, 288, P.675; 'Taylor v. 
Aetna Life Insuranc.li/Co. (1933). 132 Cal. 
App. 434, 439, 22P.2d 71'S.) 
. ~ -
[9] Plaintiff urges:1 that the trial court's 
action in denying de{~ndant's motions for 
mistrial and for new I"ial. made upon the 
ground of misC()nductiiof plaintiff's counsel 
in moving to amend i~ the presence of the 
jury establishes the ali~ence of prejudice to 
defendant (see Cope 11. Davison (1947), 30 
Cal.2d 193, 180 P.2d ~73, 171 A.L.R. 667.) 
However, as held in !f:ittlv. Bava (1928). 
supra. 204 Cal. 136, 14\>; 266 P. 954, "While 
it is true that the oohclusion of the trial 
-court on the motiofl -lor a new trial is en-
titled to much consi'd~ration its decision 
thereon is not conclusive on appeal t~ 
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There is no contention that the making 
and granting of the motion, under the cir-
cumstances shown, can be justified as • 
permissible request for, and making of, com-
ment on the evidence. (See Cal.Canst. Art. 
VI, sec. 19.) 
The judgment is reversed and the Cause 
remanded for a new trial. 
SHENK, EDMONDS and SPENCE, JJ., 
conCUT. 
GIBSON, Chief Justice, and TRAYNOR, 
Justice. 
We dissent. 
It is our opinion that this cause was COT-
rectly decided by the District Court of 
Appeal and that the judgment should be 
affirmed for the reasons set forth in the 




The majority decision by four justices 
of this court reaches a new low in search 
for a reason to reverse a judgment abun-
dantly supported by evidence and based 
upon the unanimous verdict of a jury. 
That judgment was approved by a most 
learned, fair, careful, experienced and 
able trial judge, and affirmed by the unani-
mous decision of a District Court of Ap-
peal composed of three learned and able 
justices with many years of trial and 
appellate court experience. Sanguinet-
ti v. Moore Dry Dock Co., CaJ.App., 220 
P.2d 398. Four members of this court 
(a majority) have reached a decision dia-
mctrical1y opposed to that reached by seven 
other members of the judiciary-the trial 
judge, three District Court of Appeal jus-
tices and three members of this cOUrt. 
That a miscarriage of justice will result 
from this decision is apparent from a re-
"iew of the record before this court, but 
the detriment to our system for the ad-
ministration of justice from the effect of 
this decision will far outweigh the loss to 
plaintiff ,who is denied justice in this case. 
The decision reached here .by these four 
justices strikes a lethal blew at the very 
heart of our judicial system-trial by jury. 
It holds, in effect, that a jury may not 
be informed as to the state of the pleadings 
in a civil action. This is contrary to all 
authorities on the subject. . While the 
majority concede that it is not error for 
the jury to be informed as to the amount 
claimed in the prayer of the complaint, 
they hold that it is incurable misconduct 
amormting to re.versible error if a motion 
to amend the complaint for the purpose of 
increasing the amount prayed for is made 
in the presence of the jury. There is not 
a scintilla of reason or common sense in 
such holding. It is so lacking in considera-
tion of the realities of the situation that 
it may be said to be naive. In 26 years of 
practice before the courts of this state, 
I heard many such motions made and grant-
ed in the presence of the jury, and in none 
of those cases did the jury award the in-
creased amount prayed for. No question 
was ever raised by either court or counsel 
as to the propriety of such practice, as 
no one ever thought that anyone could be 
misled thereby, it being well understood 
among lawyers and laymen alike that a 
demand for damages is not evidence that 
plaintiff is entitled to damages in any sum 
whatsoever. The fact that in this case 
the jury awarded the increased amount 
prayed for is no indication that they were 
influenced by the motion which they heard 
or the ruling of the court thereon which 
they did not hear. Although the majority 
opinion so implies, jurors are not fools. 
Even if they are not lawyers, they have 
much more intelligence than the majority 
opinion indicates. They are entitled to 
know, and should be informed, at the 
beginning of the trial the amount plaintiff 
is seeking to recover. It certainly would 
have been proper for either the court or 
counsel to inform the jury at the beginning 
of the trial that plaintiff was claiming 
$50,000 damages. And, as the majority 
seem to concede, if the motion to amend 
had been made out of the presence of the 
jury, it would have been 'proper for the 
court to have advised the jury at the close 
of the case, as it did, that they could not 
return a verdict in excess of $75,000, the 
amount then claimed. Is the conclusion 
not inescapable that the jury then muSt 
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know that plaintiff had amended his com-
plaint by increasing his demand? But, 
suppose a juror did not know how or why 
the amount of the. demand had been in-
creased, and made inquiry, of the court. 
could thecollrt flOt say· that plaintiff had 
moved to amend his complaint by incrcas· 
lng- the amount prayed for, and the court 
had allowed such amendment? To say 
that such statcmen\ is not permissible is to 
make ostriches out of jurors, or,.place them 
~ehind an "iron curtain/' a ,practice which 
should not be countenanced in any enlight-
~ned system for the administration of jus-
tice. The rcaedonary philosophy of the 
majority opinion ilO so out of harmony with 
prescnt day concepts of trial. procedure 
that- it resembles some of the skclcton~ of 
the dead past, when conservative minded 
judges found such technical and. fine-spull. 
reasons _ . for reversing judgments based 
upon jury verdicts, that the people of thi!l 
. itatc were constrained to adopt § 4!,1 of 
.'\rtide VI of 'our Constitution, imposing 
lipan appellate courts the requirement of 
ndermining that any error committed 'by 
a trial court must have resulted in a mis-
~arriage of justice before reversing a jmtg'-
ment based upon a jury· verdict. The li-
heral concept of _ this constitutional pro-
vision has evidently not impressed the ma-
jority of this' court, as there is no su'ggc!I-
tif)n in the majority opinjon that a mi~­
.;a.rrlage of justice resulted from the alleged 
errol' in this case. 
. It is conceded by the majority that their 
tlecision is not supported by a single de-
cision of any cOtJrt of this state. It, .sC'd~S 
logical that an unprejudiced mind '!$e~kil1g 
to 'rationalize the absence or latk-Iof' ;such 
dt'cisions during a peri~ of over lOO,,:yeats 
'nt the judicial history_of this statE',':and the 
further fact that the statutory law ~f tIie 
.fjtate is silent On the -suhject, would :cori-
elude that the practice of making ,stich 
-motions in the presence of the jury, h~d 
never 'heretofore -been con~idcred: t' itri-
proper or cause for assignment :Of, ,Imis_ 
conduct or error. It should he apparent 
to every unprejudiced _ mind, as it" is _ to 
me, that the majority, in seizing upon this 
motion as the sale ground for a reversal 
of the judgment in this case, is simply 
creating a mythical error which exists OI~ly 
in hypertechllical illusion. Certainly, with 
the widespread practice of making such 
motions in the presence of the jury-well-
known to trial lawyers throughout the 
state-some appellate court at some time 
during the history of the state ·would have 
been called upon to hold _ such practice 
error if there was the slight<st hasis for 
such holding. . 
Furthermore, if such practice were as 
deadly and vicious ,as the majo~ity, o'pinion 
indicatE'S, it is more than probable that the 
public liability insurance companies and 
utilities wonld havt~ instrncted their lobby 
group to prevail upon the Legislature to 
enact legislation prohibiting such practice. 
That· this has J10t occurred is persuasive.· 
evidence of the recognized propriety of 
!iuch practice. 
To my mind the _majority decision in this 
case is an abuse of the judicial process . 
¥lc have here four judges, without tlrec(,M 
dent or authority, announcing a rule con-
trary to the practice which has prevaitl"d 
throt1ghollt the history of the state, and 
contrary to the holding. of seven E'qualty 
trained ,and ex.perienc~d judges. What 
these four judges have done here is in' 
direct conflict with the vie~v, expressed by 
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his work entitled 
"The Nature of the Judicial Process," 
He there declared. 'at page 112: "~~y 
analysis of the judicial fJ(ocess comes -then 
to this. and little morE': logic, and history, 
and custom, and ntility •. ~nd the' acccpt~d 
standards of right conduct, arc the forces 
whkh singh' or -in combination shape the 
prdgrcss of the law. \Vhich (if these forc-
.cs: :shall dominate in any cast',. '~ltst de~ 
perld largely upon the comparatiYe im-
pottance or vahie of. the social' interest~ 
tha!t \\'1.1.1 be· therehy promoted or irppaired." 
, 
,\\rhat these _ four judges have done here 
is" likewise contrary to the philo~ot>hy ex· 
pr~sscd .by Judge Salmond at pages 192-
19.~ of the 10th edition of his' work 011 
Ju~isprlldcnce. where he said: "vVhcre, 
theJ1, do courts derive -tho,se new principles, 
or rationes decidendi, by which they sup-
plement the existing Jaw? They arc in 
truth nothing. else than the principles of 
na,tttral justice, practical expediency, and 
_____________ .~_-- ~~_.~+ _________ ,..,""'=.,it..,""llll£i'.'~""' _____________ _ 
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common sense. Judges are appointed to 
administer justice-justice according to 
law, so far as the law extends, but so far 
as there is no law, then justice according 
to nature." 
In essence, what these four judges have 
done here, is to blindly announce a court-
made rule which not only finds no support 
in history, precedent, experience, custom, 
practice, logic, reason, common sense or 
natural justice, but is in utter defiance of 
each and all of these ~tandards. 
I shall now proceed to demonstrate the 
fallacy of the holding of the majority in 
this case. 
Section 473 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides: 
"The court may, in furtherance of jus-
tice, and on such terms as may be proper, 
allow a party to amend any pleading or 
proceeding by adding or striking out the 
name of any party, or by correcting a 
mistake in the name of a party, or a mis-
take in any other respect; * * * The 
court may likewise, in its discretion, after 
notice to the adverse party, allow, upon 
such terms as may -be just, an amendment 
to any pleading or proceeding in other 
particulars; • • •. " 
As was said in Isaacson v. Union Trust 
Co., 95 Cal.App. 633, 638, 273 P. 119, 121, 
"The matter of the allowance of trial 
amendments to the pleadings rests in the 
sound discretion of the court, and such 
ruling should not be disturbed upon appeal 
in the absence of a showing that prejudice 
result~d therefrom to the extent that the 
party aggrieved was deprived of a sub-
stantial right or placed in a position where 
it may be said that he was deprived of a 
fair trial." See, also, Unruh v. Kauffman, 
205 Cal. 238, 244, 270 P. 440; Duffey v. 
General Petroleum Corp., 93 Cal.App.2d 
757, 759, 209 P.2d 986; 21 Cal.lur. 181 
Further, "It is the settled law of this 
state that ·motions to amend pleadings to 
the end that justice may be promoted 
are to be Jiberally granted." Rabe v. 
Western Union Tel. Co" 198 Cal. 290, 
299-300, 244 P. 1077, 1080; Klopstock 
v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 13, 19, 108 
P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318; Carter v. Loth-
ian, 133 Cal. 451, 452, 65 P. 962; Mc-
Dougald v. Hulet, 132 Cal. 154, 162, 64 
P. 278; Crosby v. Clark, 132 Cal. I, 8, 
63 P. 1022; Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 630, 
633, 30 P. 786. The same rules are appli-
cable to amendments increasing the amount 
of damages alleged. Duffey v. General 
Petroleum Corp., supra; Hoffman v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 101 Cal.App. 218, 
229, 281 P. 681. It has also been held that 
the right to amend should not be denied 
merely because the new matter to be added 
may have been known to the applicant 
at the time of filing his original pleading. 
Tolbard v. Cline, 180 Cal. 240, 245, 180 
P. 610; Kroplin v. Huston, 79 Cal.App.2d 
332, 340, 179 P.Zd 575. Moreover, an 
amendment increasing the damage claim 
does not change the cause of action stated. 
Babcock v. Jewell, 110 Cal.App. 323, 320-
326, 294 P. 30. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court 
abused its discretion in granting the mo-
tion to amend because defendant was there-
by surprised and prejudiced. This con-
tention is predicated upon the assertion 
that defendant's liability insurance was 
limited to $50,000, the original amount of 
the ,prayer, and accordingly "the insurance 
company had been the sole party in inter-
est" prior to the a·mendment This argu-
ment is also utterly devoid of merit. Two 
days prior to the making of the motion, 
the attorney supposedly representing de-
fendant was informed that it would be 
made. While defendant's request for a 
continuance was denied, no good reason for 
granting it appears. Defendant's attorney 
informed the cOUrt at tpat time that he 
knew he was supposed to proceed with 
defendant's case and he stated that de-
fendant's witnesses were present. The in-
creased prayer, as heretofore shown, did 
not change the cause of action and it did 
not inject any new issue into the case. 
Any arrangement _ between defendant and 
its insurance carrier as to the conduct 
of the litigation couJd not possibly affect 
plaintiff's right to amend. 
Since the granting of the motion to 
amend would be a proper exer<:ise of dis-
cretion by the trial court, the sole ques-
tion is whether, under the circumstances 
here, the making of that motion in the 
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presence of the jqry constituted prejudicial weight to which they are entitled, w~re 
misconduct requiring a, 'reversal of the plainly wrong. X do not believe tha.t Iliere 
judgment. is. any misconduct invol~d hi -the action 
Section 657 of the Code of Civil Proce- of plaintiff's attorney .. In my opinion this 
dure-: authorizes the granting of a, new contention does f1o~ .eve':l present a_ sub-
t~ial for: ".1. Irr,cgularity -in the pro- stantial 'question 'worthy of 'extended dis~ 
ccedings_ of _ the ,court, jury or adverse cussion by an appellate court. But e~en 
party, or any order of ,the. court or abuse assuming" the existence of mis,conduct, it' 
of .discretion by. which· either party was is impossible to conceive how any preju-
prevented from having .& fair. trial; dice to defendant could ,haVe tesulted, 
• • *.,,' especially in view of the evidence, the 
. :Underthi..ection, then, the alleged 
misconduct of counsel, in order to war-
rant a reversal of a judgment and the 
granting of a new trial, must be such as to 
have denied a fair trial to the complain .. 
ing party. Robinson v. Western States 
Gas & Elec. Co;, 184 Cal. 401, 407, 194 
'P. 39; Langford v. Kosterlitz, 107 Cal. 
App. 175, 186, 290 P. SO; Mullanixv. 
J!asich, (j7 CaI.App.2d 675, 686, 155 P.2d 
130; Gerberieh v.· Southern California 
Edis!>Il Co.. 26 CaI.App.2d 471,476, 79 
l' 2d 783; . Coppock v. :Pacific Gas & . Etec. 
Co., 137 CaI.App. SO, 90 •. 30P,2d 549. 
It .. i. also elementary that a trial judge is 
in a better position than an appellate court 
~o :determine whether a verdict. resulted 
wholly, or .in part, from the asserted mis-
conduct of c;ounsel, and his -c!>nelusion in 
the matter will not be disturbed unless it 
is plainly wrong. Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal. 
2d 193. 203, ISO P 2d 873, 171. A.I.R. 
f567; Walling v.Kimball, 17 0.1.2d 364, 
368-369,110 P.2d 58; Lafargue v. Unit-
'~d Railroads, 183 Cal. 720, 724, 192 P. 
'538. As was said in Hatfield 'Y. Levy 
Brothers, 18 CaI.2d 798, 814, 117 P2d 841. 
849, 'fA denial of .a, motion for & new trial 
made upon the ground of misconduct· of 
Counsel, although not binding on th,s 
~rt, is entitled to great _weight, ~ an 
appeal in which complaint i. made of the 
miltCOnduct." Here, the trial coUrt ~nied 
motions for mistrial and for a new trial 
based upon the asserted misconduct of 
plaintiff's attorn~y. 
. Viewed ;n the. light of these pri!>-
clples, then, the majority decision is .that 
the action. of counsel for plaintiff had 
.the . effect of. denying a fair trial to de-
fendant and the rulings of the trial court 
to the contrary, giving them the great 
instructions and the fulings of the trial 
court ,on the qu~stion. 
Plaintiff's case· was based u~n the 
theory that defendant was negligent in 
maintaining the tug engine with a defec· 
tive clutch and that this negligence was 
the. proximate caUSe of plaintiff's injuries. 
Plaintiff testified that shortly after· he be· 
came the tug operator for defendant .1n 
September, 1945, he discovered that the 
clutch would stick so that he· could not 
shift from forward speed. When this hap-
pened he would sometimes have to leave 
the pilot house and go down to the en· 
gine room to disengage the clutch. . lie 
could not shut off the engine from the 
pilot house. He reported the clutch diffi-
cultie. to Acosta, .. the. plant engineer in 
charge of maintenance and repairs. He 
also spoke to Acosta about getting .an en-
tirely new engine, including a· clutch. 
Acosta considered such a purc~, but· de-
Cided against it. Although plaintiff re-
quested it. no work was done on the clutch 
wh~n the t\1g was taken out of the water 
in January, 1947, to repair the propeller. 
The clutch difficulties increased in Feb-
.J7UlU'Y and April of 1947. Knapp, the gen-
eral superintendent 'If defendant company, 
told plaintiff that they MOre not going to 
spend any more ~oney. on the --Queen 
Mary." 
Aniialla and Hagstead, who worked .s 
deck hands on the tug, alsO testified as to 
difficulties with the clutch. 
Plaintiff also testified that the clutch 
again stuck on May Z. 1947, while· the 
tug was being used to bring a barge .from 
San Francisco. Plaintiff called to An-
nalla to come into the pilot hoUse and 
take the wheel. He then went down to 
the engine room and turned ·the clutch 
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control tht!re. Both- AnnaUa and Pestana, 
the crant:: operator on the 4errick barge, 
corroborated plaintiff's account of this in-
cident. 
Plaintiff further testified _ that, subse-
quently on the same day, while he was 
attempting to dock the barge at the 8th 
Street pier on tbe Oakland side 0 f tbe 
bay, the clutch stuck once more. The 
tug was tben about 12 to 15 feet from tbe 
barge, coming in at a slight angle toward 
it at a speed of about two or three knots 
per hour. Plaintiff was unable to shift 
into n'eutral. He did not have time to 
go down to the engine room as he was 
afraid that the tug would ram into an oil 
tank and cause an explosion. He thought 
that the best thing to do in order to stop 
the tug was to throw a line on the barge 
and jump over to secure it. When the 
tug was about two or three feet away 
from the barge, plaintiff threw a looped 
line (called a spring or breast line) on 
the barge and jumped over to the barge 
at the saine time. He was off balance 
from this fast movement and his legs 
slipped over the side of the barge. His 
left leg was pinned between the barge 
and the ,tug as- the tug came in and that 
leg was crushed, He finally pulled him-
self up on tbe deck of the barge. (He 
did not testify tbat he jumped back and 
forth from the tug to the barge.) The 
forward motion of the tug was stopped by 
the rope that plaintiff had managed to get 
oVer a bit on the barge. He testified 
tbat, but for the faulty clutch on the tug. 
he would not have jumped from the tug 
to the barge. He . did not have time to 
shout to. the deck hand (who was then on 
the barge). There was no other eye-
witness testimony of the accident. 
Pestano, the crane operator, did not see 
the accident He heard plaintiff shout for 
help and found him with both legs hanging 
over the side of the barge. The tug was 
then about two feet away from the barge 
and was tied to the barge >by the spring line 
described by plaintiff. 
Annalla was on the barge and did not 
witness the accident. He found plaintiff 
dangling over the side of the barge. The 
spring line was then fastened between the 
barge and the tug. This line was ordinarily 
used to pull a barge into uock and it was 
his, Annalla's, job as deck hand to handlt 
this rope. After -the accident ,he went 
aboard the tug and shut off' everything. 
Knapp, the general superintendent, testi-
fied that plaintiff had told him that the tu. 
needed a new engine. He knew that there 
was trouble with the clutch and he dis-
cussed that with plaintiff (although he also 
testified that he did not recall specific com-
plaints about the clutch). The engine was 
old and obsolete and the purchase of a new 
one had been -considered. Plaintiff was not 
required by -any rules of the company t('l 
keep the tug in repair. Acosta, the plant 
engineer, was the person in charge of such 
matters. After the accident the clutch was 
taken out of the tug and repairs were made 
on it. 
Acosta testified that he was in full control 
of repairs of equipment in the yard in 1947. 
He talked to plaintiff a number of times 
about the general condition of the Moore 
No.2, but he did not recall specific coni-
plaints about the clutch. After the acci· 
dent, when the clutch was repaired it 
showed only normal wear. Some parts 
were replaced. He did not find anything 
which, in his opinion, would cause tht" 
clutch to stick. (The marine shop foreman 
gave the same opinion.) 
The testimony of Exter, a foreman 'of 
defendant's marine machinists in 1947, 'was 
that plaintiff nad told him of the clutch 
sticking. Exter would take complaints to 
Acosta as he could not do anything without 
a work order from the latter. The tug was 
not operated between the time of the acci-
dent and the time the clutch was taken out 
and repaired. When they took the clutch 
cover off they could see that the bushings 
and gears were badly worn and that there 
was ·a great deal of slack in the pins and 
rods which operated the clutch from the 
pilot house. 
Forrest, a marine machinist employed by 
defendant, stated that he found the clutch 
in bad shape after the accident and he had 
it taken completely out and sent it to the 
.hop. After the clutch was restored to the 
tug, he checked it and it did not look safe 
to him. He thought that the clutch would 
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,still stick. He did som~ more work on it rough ,s,urfaces, or.do.-anything which call! 
· and thereafter the. clutch functioned prop- for the correct maintenance of one's bal-
,,- 'I . .. j ~ •• 
er1y. anee." His walking capacity, as to dis· 
Dr. Wagner,- an orthope4ic surgeoll, gave tan'ce,. is. very .limited. (Plaintiff set the 
the only medical testimony. He began limit at abollt twobl~&s and stated that he 
treating plaintiff .after· October 4, 1947. cannot walk at.all,Hithout severe pain.) 
· The x-ray pictures show ifractures of the Plaintiff testified that ·he is. 33 years of 
tibia of the left ieg which extelld into the age and is married.: In addition to his em· 
ankle joint. The union of the upper -and ployment with dc~e,9da~t as a ,tug operator 
fower fragments of the tibia will not be and a- rigger, he has worked as a commer-
eomplete for several more months., There cial fisherman and 'on a' pile driver. He 
is an irregulatity of the ankle joint _due to knows no o~h_er occupations. His education 
the fractures which is called an "overlapped wa_s halted' when: he was in the eighth 
- ,foot." Such a condition is generally pro- grade. His wag{ ~s a tug op~rator was 
gressive. A marked deossification" Ct.1-n -be $1.RO per-hour, bu.~, the wage scale-has since 
. seen. been raised. His,:,~ages' for .the last four 
The' dinical treatment' of plaintiff was \vccks prior to the:accident totalled $407.46. 
",[50 described. T'he cast was kept on the During the past 8 ot 9 months plaintiff bOas 
le'ft leg until December, 1947. The- leg was heen working in ~ radio shop, taking care 
bandaged nntil about February, 1948. Then of it when the me'chanic 'goes out on calls. 
· a foot drop brace was applied which has a His earn'ings from t~is vary from $5 to $20 
-~ri'illg adion designed to' force the foot - a week, depending' apon the titne the store 
upwards into a normal (right angle) po- is left in his care~ i, ( 
sition. Plaintiff was constantly in pain There is evid'enc;e that the 1if~ e~pectancy 
during this period. The brace did not is 36.12 years for" ';"'hite male'of plaintiff's 
force the foot ·back into a normal pos~tion age.. The amount ,rc;quired to pay a person 
and the foot is now permanently deformed of that age the suni c# $250 a month:~ntil he 
as a, result of the injury. and deossification. is 65 years of age, cq~puting the interest at 
Plaintiff cannot move his foot upwards at 2%, would ,be $64,048. If the interest rate 
all. He lacks about 50 degrees of normal '\~~re 2¥2%,'lhe net~sary amount would be 
movement of the left foot. If he walk, .at $60,055. The ,urn' df $56,430 would be re" 
all it will be ~ith.a limp. ql~ired if the interest~'rate'were 3%-. 'Th'ere 
P~aintiff ,is- slo\vly recovering :from a is testimony that j~ insurance companies 
paralysis of the peroneal nerve and there is would guarantee an interest- rate of between 
" permanent weakness and wMtagc of the 2% and Z%%. " i: . 
· muscles 111 the left leg. 'Defendant gave--no-evidence on thc'sub-
The only operations possible are an am- ject of damag:e~. t~'his opening statement, 
putation of the left foot or a fusilll( of the defendant', counsel ':stated that the exist-
ankle joint, making it'rigid. T'he pain will cnce of injuries was~ conceded and thc' only 
grow worse,- but plaintiff should avoid question for the jury' was whether defend-
either of these operations until l the pain bc- ant was liahle ther<i'ft)r. 
comeS so -severe and is combined with so The instruction~ to the jury contained 
much Hmitatioll of activity that an opera- the following: !I 
t1:on becomes absolutely necessary. He will'- . i: ~; - .' 
"You witl _ distin,c~ .•. ly understand that in 
,have to wear the leg brace continuously t 
·this charge the C!>tU·t ,is in no manner or 
ui1less an operation is performed. form expressing, or idcsircs to express, any 
. -rh.e disability is such _that plaintiff "will opinion on the .wdi~ht of the evidence, or 
nO.t be able to return to any Quty. that re- 3ny _ part thereof j Ifor doc~ the COt1r~ cx-
quires constant standing or wa1kinJ'{, or auy press any opinion a~' to the tn,lth or fahity 
physi~al effort such as climbing or doing of the testimony ~f :kny ,witness; nor tioes 
~Y."erbe~d., w.ork. He should. not engage ill, the Court in any m~uincr or form' c~press its 
any activity that would require walking 011 opinion that any alleged fact in this case is 
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or is not proven. * * * (Q)uestions of 
fact * • • are matters entirely within 
your province. * • * 
"If the judge of this Court has at any 
time during this trial used any language, 
or has seemed to you to indicate the opinion 
of the judge as to any question of fact * * 
you must not be influenced thereby, but 
must determine yourselves all questions of 
fact without regard to the opinion of any-
one else. * * • 
"You will be instructed on the subject of 
the measure of dam-ages in this action, beM 
cause it is my duty to instruct you as to all 
the law that may become pertinent in your 
deliberations. IJ of course, do not know 
whetMr you will need 'nstructions on Ihe 
measure of damages, and the fact that they 
have been given to you must not be con-
sidered as intimating any opinion of ~ 
own on the issUe of liability or as 10 which 
Parly is entitled 10 your verdict. * * • 
"You are instructed that the law pre-
scribes no definite measure of damages, 
but the law leaves such damages to be fixed 
by you as your discretion dictates and as, 
under all the circumstances, may be just 
and proper. * * * 
tiThe damages must be reasonable and 
cannot b~ in excess of tke amount alleged in 
1M complaint, n"mely $75,000.00. • * * 
"You are instructed. that if your verdict 
is in favor of the plaintiff, then in fixing 
damages you should award such amount as 
will compensate for the injuries sustained, 
if any, including such amount as will com .. 
pensate for the pain and suffering en-
dured. * * * 
"If you believe from the evidence that the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff are per .. 
manent in their character, then you will 
take into account the period of time in the 
future during which he will be expected to 
suffer such pain, humiliation, disfigure-
ment, or disability, if any. * * * u 
(Emphasis added) 
The jury was also fully and fairly in-
structed on the elements of damages and 
th,e subjects of negligence, contributory 
negligence, comparative negligence and 
proximate cause. 
The motion to amend the prayer of the 
complaint was argued and granted in cham-
bers. And although the jury was never in-
formed of the court's action on the motion, 
the majority opinion intimates that the 
jury could infer from the emphasized in-
struction, naming the amount of plaintiff's 
claim, as increased by the amendment, that 
the motion was granted, that the granting 
of the motion indicated the trial judge's be-
lief that the evidence warranted a larger 
recovery than that originally claimed, and 
that it is possible that the jury disregarded 
aU the other explicit instructions and re-
turned a verdict based upon this double in-
ference. The foregoing review of the evi-
dence and instructions demonstrates that 
this asserted possibility is devoid of reali-
ty, and is the result of fantastic specu]a-
tion by the majority, who utterly iguore the 
determination of the trial court that de-
fendant suffered no prejudice as a result 
of the motion or instruction. 
The majority opinion states that preju-
dice to defendant must have occurred from 
the asserted misconduct because the doc-
trine of comparative negligence was in-
volved in this action and for the further 
reason that the jury returned its verdict 
within 3S minutes after the case was sub-
mitted to it. No reason is stated, and I 
am unable to find any reason, why the jury 
should have taken more time to resolve 
the simple ·factual issues presented. The 
only real disputed question as to a proba-
tive fact was whether or not the clutch was 
defective. Although considerable evidence 
was received during the trial, most of it 
was directed to that issue. 
Neither is there any explanation as to 
how the presence of the comparative negli-
gence doctrine indicates prejudice to de-
fendant. Even if it be assumed that the 
jury could infer from the instructions that 
the motion to amend the prayer was grant-
ed and that this was done because the 
trial judge believed that the evidence of 
plaintiff's injuries would justify a larger 
verdict, there is nothing whatsoever upon 
which an inference could be based lhat 1M 
court believed Ihal plaintiff was entitled 
to recover al aU. As heretofore quoted, 
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the jury .was specifically charged that in- whelming evidence." It is obvious that 
,tructions on the subject of the measure of this statement is not based upon anything 
damages were given so that_~e instructions in the record. As ,has heen pointed out, 
would completely state ,the 1aw applicable the evidence on the matter of damages was 
to the issues in the case, and that "the fact "undisputed," and this ,is the matter as to 
that they (instructions on damages) have which the alleged misconduct or error was 
been given to -you must not be considered directed. .Also, the evidence in favor of 
as intimating an,y opinion of my own on plaintiff on the subject of contributory neg-
the issue of liability: ,or as to which party ligence could accurately b~ described as 
is entitled to your,,verdiCt." Moreover, the <40verwhelming." The testimony indicating 
motion to amend was made at the close of defendant's negligence also appears to be 
plaintiff's case and ~efore the introduction clear and convincing. 
of any evidence by the defendant, that is, The m~jority decision here is entirely 
before the trial judge had any knowledge out of line with the California decisions 
as to- the merits of defendant's case con- dealing with misconduct of counsel. Thus, 
testing its liability. in the following cases the ruling of the trial 
The evidence also indicates that,the eru- court in denying a new trial on the ground 
cial and decisive-question in the c~se was of misconduct of,counsel was not disturbed 
whether or not defendant negligently ,main- upon appeal, although the instances of ai-
tained defective equipment. The principal leged misconduct as set forth below are far 
defense'.was- lack of negligence-lack of more serious than the actions of plaintiffs 
any responsibility for the serious injuries attorney in this ease: 
admittedly suffered by ,plaintiff .. Plaintiff During the trial plaintiff's attorney read 
introduced substantial, if not overwhelm- the' contents of incompetent (hearsay) doc-
ing, evidence- in support of his position on 'uments in the presence of the jury. Robin-
this point. Even the witnesses for defend- son v. Western States Gas & Elec. Co .• 
ant conceded that the tug engine was ob- 184 Cal 401 407 '194 P 39 supra, . . " .; see, 
solete and _in need of some repairs., It is also, Lafargue v. United Railroads, supra, 
apparent that the jury was entitled, if not 183 Cal. 720, 192 P. 538. Defendant's coun-
compelled. to find in favor .of -plaintiff on sel, in a personal injury action, repeatedly 
the matter of defendant's negligence. got before the jury the idea that their side 
There was little, if any, evidence tending had an eyewitness to the accident who saw 
to show any contributory negligence on the the plaintiff run in front of the train, aI-
part of plaintiff. The nature of the case though such a witness was never produced. 
is such that it is highly improbable t.hat'the Rather v. City a.-nd County 0'£ San Fran-
jury could have believed plaintiff's evi- cisco, 81 CaI.App.2d 625, 637, 184 P.2d 7Z1. 
deuce concerning defendant's negligence Counsel for the plaintiff habitua~ly mispro-
whi,le at the same time rejecting plaintiffs nounced the _defendant's name -during the 
evidence as to ,his lack 'of contributory neg- trial and in'·the 'course" of argument reo 
.ligence. There ,was no dispu~e as to the ferred to plaintiff as an American -boy; the 
nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, the inference being that counsel was purposely 
extent and duration of his disability. the trying to prejudice the jury- against a man 
degree to which his' earning power was im· with a foreign name. Porter v. Granich, 
paired, or the amount of pain and stlffer- 136 CaI.App. 523, 531, 29 P.2d 220; see, 
ing caused .by the injuries. The verdict ,is also, Spear v.,Leuenberger, 44 Ca1.App.2d 
not excessive in 'view of this evidence. 236, 112 P.2d 43. In his opening statement 
. See McNulty v. Southern Pacific ·Co .• 96 in an action for assault and battery, the 
Cal.App.2d 841, 846-851, 216 P.2d 534, and attorney for the plaintiffs referred to the 
Cases cited. defendants as desperadoes, racketeers" cat. 
The majority opinion states: "This is tIe gangsters and drunken brutes. D,eevy 
not * * * a case in which the error v. Tassi, 21 Cal.2d 109, 121-122, 130 P.2d 
can be said to be nonprejudicial because the 389; see. aiso, "McCabe v. Cheseldine, 117 
issues were resolved on undisputed or over- Cal.App. 526, 4 P.2d 282. Defendants' 
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counsel, in arguing to the jury, accused 
plaintiff's attorney of refusing to settle the 
case because of his wish to receive a iarge 
fee. In his opening statement plaintiff's 
attorney had stated that "we have sued for 
$15,000." The verdict was in favor of 
plaintiff for $600, although the injuries 
were serious. Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal. 
App.2d 524, 529-530, 152 P.2d 526; ,ec, 
also, Fintel v. Engelbrecht, 28 Cal.App.2d 
23, 81 P.2d 1044. In an action against a 
contractor for personal injuries sustained 
by an employee of the Bureau of Reclama-
tion during the construction of a dam, 
there were repeated references by plain-
tiff's attorney to the fact that the contrac-
tor held a $35,000,000 contract to construct 
the dam. Miller v. Pacific Constructors, 
Inc., 68 Cal.App.2d 529, 551-;.'2, 157 P.2d 
57; see, also, Alberts v. Lytle, 1 Cal.App. 
2d 682, 691-692, 3i P.2d 705. Plaintiff's 
counsel made statements which tended to 
."Uggest to the jury that plaintiff was im-
poverished and without means, where 
there was no evidence of such poverty. 
Hodge v. Weinstock, Lubin & Co., 109 Cal. 
App. 393, 401-403, 293 P. 80; see, also, 
Oakes v. Baker, 85 Cal.App.2d 168, 192 
P.2d 460. The attorney for plaintiff rep-
resented to the jury in his opening state-
ment the existence of facts (that defendant 
corporation's equipment was old and obso-
lete, undermanned, and without proper 
safeguards) which plaintiff was prepared 
to prove, but which plaintiff did not attempt 
to prove and which he allegedly knew at 
the time could not be proved. Mudrick v. 
Market Street Ry. Co., 11 Cal.2d 724, 737-
738, 81 P.2d 950, 118 A.L.R. 533; see, also, 
Adylott v. Key System Transit Co., 104 
Cal.App. 621, 286 P. 456. In his closing 
argument counsel for plaintiff, without any 
basis in the evidence, painted defendant 
company as accustomed to callously trying 
to "beat" claims of its patrons by such 
means as subjecting them to the expense 
of lawsuits, influencing witnesses by sug-
gestion and confusing evidence, and the use 
of political influence. Jonte y. Key System, 
89 CaI.App.2d 654, 201 P.2d 562; see, also, 
Girard v. Irvine, 97 Cal.App. '377, 275 P. 
840. In discussing the testimony of a po~ 
lice officer who had bten a witness for the 
plaintiff, dcf~tlllant's attorney reicrred to 
police scandals not connected with the case. 
Woebbe v. Sperry, 48 Cal.App.2d 340, 344, 
119 P.2d 743; sec, also, Walters v. Evick, 
93 Cal.App. I, 15-16, 268 P. 1061. In an 
action on promissory notes to which th(; 
defense of frauu was interposed, counsd 
for defendants repeatedly referred to the 
verdict of the jury in another case finding 
the procurer of the notes guilty of fraud. 
although the judgment in that case had 
been reversed. Liberty Bank v. Nonnen-
mann, 96 Cal.App. 478, 487-488, 274 P. 
568; sec, also, Draper v. Hellman Commer-
cial T. & S. Bank, 203 Cal. 26, 4(}..41, 263 
P. 240; Weddle v. Loges, 52 Cal.App.2d 
115, 123, 125 P.2d 914. 
Comparing the majority decision with the 
foHowing criminal cases dealing with the 
misconduct of prosecuting attorneys as se: 
forth below in which judgments of com"ic-
tion were affirmed, it seems that the life 
and liberty of the defenuants in those case" 
was not as highly valued as are the -fund~ 
of defendant corporation here: 
In the course of his case the prostcl1!-
iog attorney called out the name of de-
fendant's wife as a witness, ahhough h(' 
was aware that she had not been sub-
poenaed and he had no intention of doing 
so. Also, in his argument to the jury, the 
prosecuting attorney made repeated refer-
ences to the defendant's failure to call 
his wife as a witness, stating that she was 
present when the events in question took 
place. People v. Klor, 32 Cal.Zd 658, 662-
664, 197 P.2d 705. Defendant, a Negro, 
was tried before an all Negro jury. In his 
opening statement the district attorney 
referred to race prejudice and stated, jn 
effeet, that the jury should convict the 
defendant if they wanted to avoid public 
criticism for favoring a defendant of their 
own race. People v. Fisher, 86 Ca1.App. 
2d 24, 32-33, 194 P.2d 116; see, also, 
People v. Macias, i7 Cal.App.2d 71, 88-89, 
174 P.2d 895. The district attorney, in 
arguing to the jury that the death sentence 
should. be imposed in a murder case, said 
that if the defendant ,were sentenced to 
life imprisonment he -would probably be 
paroled in ten or twelve years and i!ltj· 
mated that the penal institutions Were 
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v!!ry crowded $0 that paroles were granted 'Which he claims was ~xcessive. The first 
without regard to. mcrit'i~ order to proyide of these was a'n instrttdion of the court 
space for in~oming prisoners. People y. to the effect that the' jury might, after 
Cae~anoJ 29 -Cal.2d 616, 619-620, 17i P.2d considering all the clements contributi~g 
1. The. closing argument of ,the- district to plaintiff's _ <iaril1lgc, 'resalve \vhat sum 
attorney contained _ references to the_ de- wi11 fairly compensate' her for "the injury 
fendants. as, ';gat}1hl(>rs." ;;ex-collyicts," and loss, if any, sustained by her; not 
"gangsters," .nid statl'nler.ts to the effect ('xc('('ding~ hm.C'c'lJer. the omoullt prayed 
tbat the county'·!'h.,ufd be p~ot~derl from fo'r in -'ftc cOlllPll1b~t., to- 'wif? $16~312.10.' 
~uch, people. People Y. :Brancato. 83 Cal. That portion at the instruction italicized 
App.2d 734, 74G-742, 189 P.2d}04. is .the ponion to which defendant'. par-
It is evident from defendant's briefs ticularly objects. An instruction' of this 
that its 'real -complaint is directed to the character is usuany given' in negligence 
giving of. the -instruction:: _naming the cases, and it is_ difficult to l1nde'r-st3nd- how 
amount of: the _prayer. From the citation a jury ~n 'sucl~ class of cases -c~n 'be prop-
of 'Cases in the majority opinion dealing erly mstructc<.l by th<.· coilrt without em-
with misconduct of the trial judge, Ber. playing language similar to that used by 
guin-v. Pacific E1ec. -Ry. Co., 203 Cal. 116, the court in t~e instructio1). complained of. 
263 p, 220; People, v, Mahoney, 201. -Cal. The,re could be no er~or, therefore, in _ so 
618,258 P. 607; People v .. Robinson; 73 Cal. instructing the jury. If the defe.dollt 
App.2d 233. 166 P.2d 17; Steele v. Ward- desired .the jury further, instructed to the 
well, 57 Cal.1\pp.2d 642, 135 P.2d 628; P,'o- effect that the amount nalned therein did 
pie v. Frank; 71 Ca1.A·pp: 57S: 236 P. 189, IIot necessarily furnish any criterion for 
and' the gil-ing of .erroneolls Instr~ctiolls~ .the a~oun't oj' titcir _",'crdic/J it 'Zoos his dutJ' 
Clement Y., State Reclamation Board, 35 to ask for such quali/)'ing ,instt"1lction? pnf/. 
Ca1.2d 628,,220, P.Z<.l 897; -'Intagliata v. flot having'd()lIe SO, he cannot be_ heard to 
Shipowners & Merchants Towboat 'C~., complain that·it. 'was not .qivcn/' (Emph"a-
26 Ca1.2d· 365, 159 P.2d I; Oettinger v. sis added.) See, also, Blantonv. CUrl}, 
Stewart, 24 C~1.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19, 156 20 Cal.2d 793, 129 P.2d I; MeNultyv. 
A.L.R.1221; People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, Southern Pacific Co., supra, 96 Ca1.App.2d 
140 P.2d 828; Pipoly v. BensOll, 20·Ca1.2d 841, 852-853, 216. P.2d. 534, and cases.ciied: 
366, 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R: 515; People Powers v .. Shelton, 74 Ca1.App.2d 757,' 765-
y: 'WiHianis;' 17 :Cal. '142;' .Bollenbach v. 766, 169.r·2d 482; .. ,c_ases collected' in ,2 
United States, 326 o,S.607, 66 S.Ct. 402. A.L.R.2d 459,,461. . . 
90 L.Ed. 350; Starr v. United States, 153 Here, assuming that the .instruction 
U~~,"614, 14,S.Ct. 919, 38,L.Ed. 841, it is naming the amount of, plaintiff's claim 
apparent. that the -majority c'onsider this as amended, waS" 'Capable_ of being mis-
inst~uction, to be ~ri1proper alld a ground interpreted in--view of the other instrrlc· 
for reyersal of the 'judgment, espedal1y in tions 'on the'matter of -liability and darn-
view of the fae,t that the jury would not ages, ,the defendant, not having requested 
have Iearned of, the grantinK'of the _motion a: 'Clarification- of the instruction, is in no 
but' for this instruction. I' position- to complain of the' lack thereof 
. The la~, of Califor~ia h~s long ];,een at,this titne~ An instruction to the 'effect 
~ettled to _ the contrary. The propriety of that the amount of the prayer was_ merely 
~uch an instruction' was upheld in Lahti ~ c1aim"and not evidence, would have been 
v. McMcnarilin" -204 Cal, 415, 421, 268 P. r'r~per and" presuma.bly, woul(ll~aye < 'hee.n 
~" 646, and the following comments are giye!\.if. requested. See CaHfornia Jury 
pertinent here: Instructions, Civil, Instructions 173 et 
,'~Defendant suggests. a ·number of cir~ ~eg.; Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles. 
cumstances happening .during the trial ?9 Ca1.2d 661, 67~74, 177 P.2d 558, 170 
.which, ,he contends, had the effect of im- A.L.R. 225. . 
.properly influencing- the jury to render ! The precise contention raised here was 
the verdict in the amount specified, and expressly rejected in Buswell v. City and 
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County of San Francisco, 89 Cal.App.2d 
123, 134, 200 P.2d 115, 121, where it was 
said: 
uThe second point brings up the question 
of whether the court should mention to the 
jury the amount sued for. It is contended 
that by so doing the judge in effect is 
.telling the jury that in the particular case 
he believes that the evidence warrants a 
finding that any SUm 'within the amOfmt 
sued for would be reasonable to (l.'umrd as 
damages. Many judges do not mention 
the sum sued for. Others do. In Hal-
linger v. York Rys. Ca., Z25 Pa. 419, 74 
A. 344, 17 Ann.Cas. 571, the practice af 
mentioning the amount is condemned. On 
the other hand, B.A.J.I., page 198 states: 
fIt is thought by some that the amount of 
damages aHeged in the complaint should 
not be stated to the jury in the instructions. 
The editorial committee feel that this is 
largely a, matter of discretion with each 
judge in each case, However, it is the 
opinion of a majority of the committee 
that there is no sound reason why the 
judge should not state the amount claimed. 
Counsel may do so, and usually do. We 
believe that the intended effect of the 
instruction is made more certain by a 
frank statement of the amount claimed. 
A noticeable avoidance of that fact might 
arouse curiosity. It may well be doubted 
that a defendant ever is injured by an 
instruction as here suggested. On the 
other hand, we feel certain that there 
have been cases when a defendant was 
helped by a jury's impression that the 
plaintiff filed an exorbitant claim. Such 
a result, however, is plaintiffs own har-
vest.' Assuming that the HoIIinger case 
states the better practice, we cannot say 
that in California the mentioning of the 
amount sued for is error." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Similarly, in Norfalk & Western Ry. 
Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114, 33 S.Ct. 
654, 57 L.Ed. 10%, an action under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 
U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., invalving the dac-
trine of comparative negligence, an in-
struction was given to the effect that, if 
the verdict was far the plaintiff, he shauld 
be awarded "such an ,amount of damages, 
not exceeding $20,000" as would com-
pensate him for the injury. The prayer 
was for the sum stated. Rejecting the 
argument that this instruction "errone-
ously conveyed to the jury an intimation 
that a finding that the plaintiff's damages 
amounted to $20,000 was justified by the 
evidence," the court stated at p. 120 of 
229 U.S., at page 656 of 33 S.Ct.: "Laok-
ing at the entire paragraph _ we think it 
could not have been understood by the 
jury as conveying such an intimation, and 
that the words now criticized could only 
have been understood as marking a limit 
beyond which ,the jury could not go." 
See, also, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. 
Carnahan, 241 U.S. 241, 244-245, 36 S.Ct. 
594, 60 L.Ed. 979; Dowell, Inc., v. Jowers, 
5 Cir., 182 F.2d 576, 580; Ritzman v. 
Mills, 102 Cal.App. 464, 468 et seq., 283 
P.88. 
The instruction questioned by, the de-
fendant in Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 
supra, 29 Cal.2d 661, 177 P.2d 558, 566, 170 
A.L.R. 225, was as follows: "The amount 
of damages alleged in the complaint to have 
been suffered by plaintiff is $8,895.00. This 
allegation is merely a claim and is not evi-
dence and must not be considered by you 
as evidence. It does, however, fix a maxi-
mum limit and you are not permitted to 
award ,plaintiff more than that amount." 
The complaint was amended at the trial to 
conform to the proof. As amended, it al-
leged items of damage for injuries caused 
by the defendant's negligence totalling 
$7,385 (general damages of $5,000 and spe-
cial damages ot $2,385), but. the prayer 
was changed ta $8,895. The defendant 
maintained that the amount stated in the in-
struction should have been the total sum 
of the items of alleged damages "rather 
than the inftat'ed figure of the prayer,"- In 
reply to this contention, it was said 29 Cat. 
2d at page 674, 177 P.2d at page 566: "Re-
gardless of the merit of defendant's' ob-
jection, which properly should have been 
made in the trial court so that the discre-
pancy could have been there obviated 
(Lahti v. McMenamin, 3)4 Cal. 415, 421, 
268 P. 644), no harm appears to flave re-
sulted from the inaccuracy in the' instruc-
tion. The verdict was for $5,000, well with-
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in the figure conceded by defendant to rep- sion to be derived from the majority opin-
resent the limit of plaintiff's total demand." ion i. that Lahti and similar case. are to be 
See, also, Sonstelie v; l)ush, 102 CaI.App. overruled sub silenlio: ApiparentIy, the 
396, 399-400, 28.3 P .. 336. It is noteworthy Pennsylvania rule is to. be adopted to the 
that the defendant's counsel in that ,case did effect that it is reversihle error for plain-
not consider it worthwhile to argue that it tiff's counsel, Carothers v. Pittsburg Rys. 
was improper to instruct the jury accurate- Co., 229 Pa. 558, 79 A., 134; Quinn v. 
Iy as to the amount of plaintiff's ~Iaims, as Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 
amended. 162,73 A. 319; Vaughan v. Magee, 3 Cir., 
Blant01l v. Curry, supra, 20 Ca!2d 793, 218 F. 630; see Porter v. Zeuger Milk Co., 
806, 129 P.2d I, 8, was an action to recover 136 Pa.Super. 48, 7 A.2d 77, or the trial 
damages for personal injuries sustained by -court, Hollinger v. York Rys. Co., 225 Pa. 
the plaintiffs when struck by an automobile 419, 74 A. 344; Reese v. Hershey, 163 Pa. 
driven by defendant Curry. It was held not 253, 29 A. 907, to state to the jury· the 
to be prejudicial error for. the trial court amount of damages claimed in anegligence 
to instruct .the jury, "by way of explana- action, despite the esta.l>lished taw and prac-
tion and example,"., that. the judgment in tice in this state to the contrary. Thus. 
the case might be for $10,000 against Curry, the majority· opinion cites with apparent 
the driver, but could be for only $5,000 approval the case of Vaughan v. Magee, 
against Koehler, the -owner of the car, un- supra, which states' and follows the Penn~ 
less it was found -that Koehler',_ was the sylvania .rule. 
principal and Curry was the ag~nt;'in which The New York cases cited by defendant 
case . there was rio such limitation as to 4eal with the propriety of allowing amend-
Koehler. The jury returned a verdict of ments to the complaint during the trial and 
$10,000 against each of the defendants. therefore they are not. in point. The basis 
. (It does not appear whether the jury ac- of the decision in Kenney v. South Shore 
complished its task within a 35 minute Natural Gas & Fuel CD., 126 App.Div. 236, 
period.) Certainly such an instruction is 110 N.Y.S. 503, 504, is illustrated by the 
'more preinant 'with _ possibilities of preju· following comments in the opinion: "It 
'dice- than is the .. ;m~ 'given in the present ,seems that the. court on -the trial of an ac-
case. .tiOn may, in the proper exercise of its 
I am unable to see any distinction of sub- discretion, permit' plaintiff to amend his 
,stance.betwee,n th~ Lahti case and the situa- complaint ,by increasing the' amount of 
, tion presented here., .It is a common prac- damages demanded. (Citations.) Although 
tice for the attorney for the plaintiff to the exercise of this power of the trial court 
state to the jury the amount of, his claim has received frequent recognition and ap-
and I am not _ aware that that practice has proval, we do not think such an amendment 
ever been questioned. See Johnson v. Mc- ,can properly be permitted simply upon 
Ree, supra, q6. CaI.App.2d 524, 530, 152 P. plaintiff's motion, unsupported by any sug-
~ 2d 526;. Ritiman v, Mills, supra, 102 Cal. gestion explaining why application for Ihe 
App.464, 472, 283 P. 88; California Jury privilege had .. 01 previously been made at 
Instructions,· Civil, p . .198.. Under the Special Term, or excusing Iheapparent 
Lahti case ~t is also, proper for the court laches in not earlier presenting such appU. 
: to instruct the jury as to the amount of the cation. Even if application had been made 
prayer. If the plaintiff states his. claim in at Special Term for the desired amend-
his opening statement the Jury, will learn ~ent, some reason showing the propriety 
,from the ipstructions whether or not' an of the amendment at that time would have 
amendment to the prayer has been allowed . been required or the motion would have 
during the trial, regardless of whether the been I'roperly denied. * • • 
-motion to_ aDlend is made in the presence or "We do not now assume to pass upon the 
absence .of the. jury .. A distinction based . question whether the plaintiff on proper 
upon the latter factor .is a distinction with· application may not, be entitled to such an 
-out a <tifference. The only possible conclu- amendment; bul hald simply that, as the 
_____________________________ "',!'il!*i,1 __ ~ _________ _ 
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case is-now prc.fctt./i.~.d to US~ ihe motion 'It'aS 
improperly granted and the verdict there-
fore unwarranted." (Emphasis added.) 
The dissenting opinion advanced the view 
that the allowance of the amendment in~ 
creasing the damage claim was \\;thin the 
discretion of the trial court. 
It is apparent that the decision in that 
case was not based upon misconduct of 
counselor the giving of erroneOUS instruc-
tions, but upon the ground that an amend-
ment to the complaint should not Ibe allowt!d 
during the trial unless the plaintiff states 
stlfficient reasons why the amcndmcllt 'was 
not requested at an earlier time when the 
facts were known to him. That it is within 
the discretion of the trial court to grant 
a motion to amend the complaint at the 
close of the plaintiff's case, as 'was done 
here, cannot be seriously questiolled in this 
state. As has been shown, the California 
practice is to liberalJ)~ allow such :lmend-
ments and the trial court's exercise of its 
discretion in this matter will rarely be dis-
turbed upon appeal. 
Sandresky v. Erie R. Co., 91 Misc. 67, 
153 N.Y.S. 612, also involves the propriety 
of granting leave to 'amend since it appears 
th~t the plaintiff therein was permitted to 
amend his complaint by increasing the dam-
age claim at the opening of the trial. The 
trial court's action at that time could not 
possibly support all inference that the judge 
believed a higher verdict was warranted. 
Pfeil v. Klein, 247 App.Div. 510, 286 )[. 
Y.S. 721, cites and follows the Kellney ami 
Sandre sky cases and the language used in 
the opinion indicates that it is based upon 
the same point. 
In Sawyer v. Munson S. S. Line, D. c., 
7 F.Supp. 193, the Kenney ease is cited for 
the following proposition: li:\Iotion to in-
crease the amount of damages should 110t 
bc made at the trial of the action, but 
should be made in advance of the tria1." 
It is trUe that there are statements in the 
Kenney and Pfeil cases to the effect' that 
an application for leave to il1cr'!ase the 
amonnt of the prayer should not be made 
in the presence of the jury. However, 
there seems to be some doubt in New York 
as' to whether the jury should ever be in-
formed or instructed in any manner as to 
the amount of unliquidated damages 
claimed by the plaintiff. See; apparently 
applying the Pennsylvania. rule, Gilbertson 
v. Forty-Second St. etc. Ry. Co., 14 App. 
Div. 294, 43 N.Y.S. 782, 784; Rost v. 
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 10 App.Div. 477, 
41 ".\".S. 1069, 1072-1073; Wersebc v. 
Ilroauway & S. A. R. Co., Misc. 4n, 21 
N.Y.S. fi3i. 
Decisions merely stating that the motion 
to amCl1ft. \\'as not made in the presence of 
the jury, as in Buswell v. City and County 
of San Francisco, supra, 89 Cal.App.2d 123, 
133, 200 P.2d 115; Sohman v. Metropolitan 
SI. Ry. CG., 56 Misc. 342, 106 N.Y.S. 1033; 
Walker v. Bradt, 225 App.Div. 415, 233 N. 
Y.S. 388; Prichard v. Dubinsky, 338 Mo. 
360, 89 S.W.2d 530; Hinchliffe v. \Venig 
Teaming Co., 274 Ill. 417, 113 N.E. 707, 
obviously do not provide any support for 
the majority decision here. 
The wild charges directly or inferentially 
made by defendant of "recklessness in ad-
vocacy," "deliberate and gross misconduct" 
which was "deHberately designed to mis-
lead and prejudice the jury," "yieious prac-
tice," and f;fraud and deceit" on the part of 
plaintiff's attorney are entirely without 
foundation in the record,' Neither does the 
reproduction of false, misleading and Sen-
sationalized newspaper articles in its peti-
tion for hearing add anything at all to the 
legal sufficiency of defendant's argument. 
Such tactics suggest that defendant's 
cOlltlsel 'believes this court to be incapable 
of determining the importance of the points 
made without the "assistance" of news .. 
paper reporters. 
V\'~ c have here .nothing more than a rou-
tine motion and a customary instruction. I 
see no misconduct in the making of the 
motion and no error in the instruction. I 
cannot understand ho\v the combination of 
the two factors results in reversible error 
under any circumstances, unless, as hereto-
fore suggested, the majority believe that 
the Pcnnsylvania rule should be adopted in 
this state, making the amount of damages 
claimed a sacred subject, not to be touched 
upon by counselor the court. Equally 
fanciful, yet finding support" in the opinion 
of the majority here, would be the argu· 
ment that the granting of a motion to 
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amend the complaint ;n 9ther respects to Alvin. Gerlack, San Frandsco, Landr~m 
conform to the proof during the trial, as & Silveira,. Merced, for appellant. 
where a new or. different cause of action _ C. Ray Robinson, by ·'V. Eugene CraveD 
or issue is injected into the case, consti- and James A. Cobey and Margaret A. Flynn, 
tutes reversible error on the ground that all of Merced, for respondent. 
this sugg ~sts to the jury that the trial judge 
believes the evidence warrants the' plain-
tiff's recovery under the amendment. 
In my opinion there was. no erTor or mis-
conduct in the trial court and the judg-
ment should' be affirmed. 
Rehearing denied; GIBSON, C. J., and 
CARTER and TRAYNOR, JJ., dissenting. 
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McCARTY 01 al. v. RASe. 
Clv.7&42. 
District Court ot Appeal, Third District, 
California. 
March 19, 1951. 
'Guy A. McCarty and aitotMr sued A. Ra· 
80 for unlawful detainer alleging '8 'breach of 
covenant and conditl,ons of a: lease relative 
to the, manner -In which defendant farmed 
premises leased to him by plaintiffs. The Su-
perior Court, Merced. County, D. Oliver Ger-
mino, J., rendered a judgment "declaring a 
forfeiture of the lease and ordering restitu-
tion of the premises to the plaintltfs, and 
the defendant appealed .. The District Court 
Of Appeal, Peek, J., held' that the action for 
unlawful detainer would lie, notwithstanding 
the tact that the lease did not expressly 
provide for re-entry or forfeiture for breach 
of the covenants and conditions concerned. 
Affirmed. 
PEEK, Justice. 
This is an appeal by defendant from a 
judgment declaring, a. forfeiture of, a lease 
and ordering restitution of the premises to 
the respondent plaintiffs, ,and from the or-
der denying defendant's motion for judg, 
ment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The settled statement upon which the 
cause is presented states that the sufficien-
cy of the evidence to sustain the materiaL 
allegations of plaintiffs' complaint is not 
questioned. Defendant's sole contention is 
that plaintiffs are precluded from maintain-
ing their action for unlawful "detainer un-
der section 1161, subd. 3 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, since 'the lel}-se' did not express-
ly provide for re-entry or forfeiture for his 
alleged breach of the covenants and condi-
tions thereof relative to the manner in which' 
he farmed the premises. 
The pertinent portions of the' section 
above mentioned provide that a: tenant of 
real property is guilty of unlawful detainer 
when he continues in possession after "a ne-
glect or failure to perform other conditions 
,or covenants 0,£ 'the lease or agreement un-
der which the property is 'held", and he has 
failed 10 perform following service upon 
him of the three day notice as therein pr~ 
vided. . 
While th~ remedy here in question exists 
!IOlely by virtue of the ,statute, and the stat-
ute, is -to be construed, Woods-Drury, Inc., 
v, S\1perior Court, 18 CatApp.2d 340, 63 P. 
2d 1184, still it bas long been the established 
, rule in this state that an action for unlaw-
Landlord and le,;anl ¢=200(2) ful detainer will lie for the breach of "any 
Lessors we:re not precluded from main- covenant or condition of the lease" j' Silva 
taining their action for unlawful detainer v_ Campbell, 84 Cal. 420, 24 P. 316, 317, upon 
under statute even though lease did not ex- the giving of the notice provided for in said 
pressly provide .for re-entry. or forfeiture statute. See also Kelly v. Teague, 63 Cal. 
for alleged breach of covenants and con- . 68; Knight v. Black, 19 Cal.App. 518, 126 
clitions ,relating to manner in which lessee P. 512. 
farmed premises. Code Civ.Proc. § 1161, The cases cited by appellant in support of 
subd. 3. his contention are not in point since each 
